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Suppose we wonder whether we should trust the deliverances of our 
basic epistemic competences. If those are indeed our basic 
competences, then in order properly to satisfy our curiosity we will 
inevitably rely on one or more of them. So, either we squelch our 
curiosity or we will have to fall into the circularity or regress to which 
the skeptic objects.1 
 
-Ernest Sosa
                                                 
1 Sosa, E. The Virtue Epistemologist. 3:AM Magazine. Retrieved from 
http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/the-virtue-epistemologist/ 
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1.1 Introduction 
The linguist J. R. Ross recounts a confrontation that occurred between William James 
and an old lady immediately after James had given a lecture concerning the structure of 
the cosmos: 
“‘Your theory that the sun is the center of the solar system, and the earth is a ball 
which rotates around it has a very convincing ring to it, Mr. James, but it's wrong. I've 
got a better theory,’ said the little old lady. 
‘And what is that, madam?’ Inquired James politely. 
‘That we live on a crust of earth which is on the back of a giant turtle,’ 
Not wishing to demolish this absurd little theory by bringing to bear the masses of 
scientific evidence he had at his command, James decided to gently dissuade his 
opponent by making her see some of the inadequacies of her position. 
‘If your theory is correct, madam," he asked, "what does this turtle stand on?’ 
‘You're a very clever man, Mr. James, and that's a very good question,’ replied the 
little old lady, ‘but I have an answer to it. And it is this: The first turtle stands on the 
back of a second, far larger, turtle, who stands directly under him.’ 
‘But what does this second turtle stand on?’ persisted James patiently. 
To this the little old lady crowed triumphantly. ‘It's no use, Mr. James – it's turtles all 
the way down.’” (Ross 1968). 
 
There is a concerning development occurring in today’s libraries stemming from a 
complex intellectual history and fed by contemporary identity culture and politics. This is 
the increasing hold that a class of ideas is having on the underpinnings of librarianship: 
namely, those ideas commonly styled ‘postmodern.’ The effect that postmodernist 
thinking has had on libraries is threefold: It gives the profession a theoretical stance
about knowledge that is unfit for accomplishing the emancipatory aims of the library; 
undermines the pursuance of libraries as a public good; indulges an unreasonable 
skepticism about authority in general. 
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Winnowing down what is meant by the word “postmodern” is a notoriously arduous task.  
The term is rife with confusing, ambiguous, and often contradictory conceptualizations, 
thus the usage of the term here deserves some preliminary attention. In addition, there 
should be no illusion that the definition attempted here is exhaustive of the myriad ways 
in which the term is employed. With those caveats in mind, we will say that 
postmodernism is the delegitimization of totalizing concepts through a method of 
genealogical/archaeological deconstruction. A totalizing concept is one that universally 
applies, whereas genealogical deconstruction is the taking apart of a concept to show the 
historical relatedness of that concept. What needs to be said about the postmodernist 
stance concerning knowledge, at this point, is that it is marked by constructivism and 
relativism. Postmodernism is constructivist because it views all knowledge as being built 
from the particular. Postmodernism is relativist because it holds that those generative 
particulars are truth conditions for that constructed knowledge. 
That being said, librarians are often very pragmatic and act in accordance with best 
practices that are empirically determined. While it would be fair enough to merely parse 
out and develop their implied theoretical stances to check for internal logical consistency, 
the result would probably appear alien to librarians and have little to no impact on their 
professional practice. However, librarians do avail themselves of postmodernist jargon 
and outcomes. For this reason, it is more effective to consider postmodernism as a project 
that implies a position, but a project that librarians have picked up for direction and 
realization of desirable outcomes–outcomes that they believe are necessarily 
concatenated with this postmodernist position. This paper will try to show that librarians 
are better served in achieving their goals by abandoning this postmodernist project and 
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position; not because the outcomes to which they’ve aspired are not desirable–in fact, 
they are–but because the positive position of postmodernism cannot support those 
outcomes.  A dedication to the postmodernist project does not support the efforts of 
librarians that have espoused such dedication, but rather undermines them. This paper 
will also show that a commitment to the postmodernist project will undermine the idea of 
libraries as a public good, as well as the futility of any strictly postmodernist rejoinder—
as it harbors a hopelessly skeptical attitude towards knowledge.
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1.2 Literature Review 
Understanding postmodernism, and what taking it on as a project in libraries might mean, 
requires this paper constructs a genealogy of if its own; one that deconstructs 
postmodernism itself and reveals its dialogical roots. Postmodernism develops from 
dissatisfaction with the physicalism that dominates the western mind for much of the 
twentieth century. However, what is it that postmodernism denies? Modernism, yes, but 
the Cartesian dualism (that there is a real distinction between the mind and body) that 
held for much of the modern period breaks apart by the twentieth century - no doubt due 
to the development of monistic metaphysics (that there is only one substance), but most 
expressly due to the raise of physicalism (that there is only one substance and it is 
physical), which is fueled by the great progresses of science during this period.  
The French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes is notably responsible for 
developing analytic geometry at the beginning of the modern period. Analytic geometry 
expresses material space mechanically in the mathematics of coordinate planes. This 
trend is indelibly modernist as it seeks a reductive explanation of reality. Descartes fears 
a solipsistic skepticism though, and he draws a sharp separation between physical space 
and the mind to effectively inoculate against this hyperbolic skepticism. The mind, 
Descartes says, is an irreducible substance, incorrigible and inexplicable via reduction.
What he created was a mystery about what the mind is, if it is not connected to the 
physical world (Descartes 1996). David Hume, the Scottish philosopher, is notably 
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responsible for ushering in a skepticism concerning the status of human knowledge in 
these “substantial” considerations. Hume did this by drawing a distinction between 
“matters of fact” and “relations of ideas”. Matters of fact are empirical and unable to be 
verified until an observer looks at the world. Alternatively, relations of ideas are true by 
definition and require no observation (Hume 2014). German philosopher Immanuel Kant 
articulates this further, and more recognizably labels, the distinction as between the a 
priori (analytic) and a posteriori (synthetic). The world is mediated through the 
experience that each individual has. Objective reality only impinges itself upon the 
individual qua these constructed experiences or is only objective insofar as it provides a 
benchmark against which to judge the accuracy of those experiences (Kant 2007). 
By the time that twentieth century physicalism arises its viability becomes an enquiry 
into the metaphysics of the mind. In other words, the greatest challenge to the physicalist 
project is whether it can account for human mentation. Ryle’s The Concept of Mind rings 
in the physicalist coup d'état with a reverberating denouncement of dualism as the “myth 
of the ghost in the machine” (Ryle 1949). What is known as philosophical behaviorism 
results: the view that mental states can be exhaustively explained solely in behavioral 
terms - or at least, predispositional criteria to behave in such and such a way. The 
inability of philosophical behaviorism to actually provide complete indefeasible sets of 
behavioral criteria for any single mental state, and the lack of predictive power it has 
within the fledgling cognitive sciences, motivates twentieth century physicalism to seek 
an expression with stronger applicability to these burgeoning sciences of the brain. 
Armstrong, Place, and Smart advance a type of reductive physicalism that numerically or 
causally identifies mental states with brain states, which allows for the scientification of 
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the mind (Armstrong 1981; Place 1956; and Smart 1959). Even though identity or causal 
theories of mind sidestep many objections, especially since it only makes a posteriori 
claims about relationships between mental states and brain states rather than a priori 
ones, it has the issue of not being generalizable to functionally similar, but non-identical, 
brains (e.g., the identity theorist’s claim that pain just is the firing of c-fibers in the brain 
will exclude any functionally similar, but non-identical “brains” from possibly being in 
pain - despite how much these unfortunate creatures’ behaviors might indicate that they 
are indeed experiencing pain!). The functionalists, taking inspiration from computer 
science, provide an escape from this last objection by the tokenization of mental states, so 
that any sort of matter that has the right functional state - or nests of functional states - 
can be ascribed the corresponding mental state (Lycan 1987). The brain is the hardware 
on which the mind operates like software—moving from one functional state to the next. 
Functionalism has both the advantageous and problematic characteristic of being 
dedicated to functional questions. It is beneficial because much is learned by the study of 
functional states in brains and their correlations to mental states. It is problematic because 
functional questions do not exhaust all the questions there are concerning the mind. An 
explanation of qualia, or what Thomas Nagel calls “what it is like,” is inexplicable via 
functional inquiry alone (Nagel 1974). Also open to this criticism are the eliminative 
materialists, like Paul and Patricia Churchland, who argue for the elimination of the 
mental altogether, or at least, the elimination of mental concepts originating from “folk 
psychologies” (Churchland 1981; Churchland 1989; Feyerabend 1963; Stich 1983). The 
postmodernist sees this inability, or refusal, to give a “complete” account of the 
 8 
phenomenal character of mind as a grave indictment of the entire project of twentieth 
century physicalism. 
Postmodernists seize upon the limits of physicalism in an attempt to motivate a general 
skepticism about the universalizability of large overarching concepts in science (e.g., 
objectivity). Lyotard has best, and most succinctly, put into words the impetus for the 
postmodernist position toward knowledge: 
“Science has always been in conflict with narratives. Judged by the yardstick of 
science, the majority of them prove to be fables. But to the extent that science does 
not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to 
legitimate the rules of its own game… Simplifying to the extreme, I define 
postmodernism as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly 
a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it” 
(Lyotard 1984). 
 
Metanarratives are exactly those universal guiding principles of science, and exactly what 
the postmodernist is suspicious of. The French intellectual Michel Foucault finds through 
sketching out the historical relatedness of the branches of science how the structures of 
authority and power, structure people’s lives in a “grid,” as it were, and are responsible 
for forging their views on the status of knowledge—A person’s “truth claims” are 
historically explicable and rely on the tools for knowing that are given to them by those 
authorities in power (Foucault 2003; Hacking 2003). Richard Rorty, an American 
pragmatist, contends that there are no universal standards for why one should choose one 
system of knowing over another. Much the same way as Lyotard claims that science must 
“legitimate the rules of its own game,” Rorty is challenging physicalists on the validity of 
their epistemic system given that their justificational beliefs are self-supposing (Lyotard 
1984; Rorty 1982). Thomas Kuhn, capitalizing on the works of Paul Feyerabend and 
Michael Polanyi, give the postmodernists their working picture of science, as an 
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institution continuously undergoing paradigmatic revolutions. Kuhn’s contention is that 
at any point in time science will view its contents through the lens of the dominant 
paradigm of that time (Kuhn 2012). LeMoine views these postmodernist developments 
concerning the status of knowledge as something that should be welcomed and adopted 
by librarians. He claims that the consequences of a postmodern library are plurality, 
inclusivity, and the eradication of marginalizing dominant narratives (LeMoine 2012).
 10 
1.3 Methods 
This paper will qualitatively examine the mission statements of libraries to look for 
indicators that the postmodernist project is adopted by libraries before discussing 
LeMoine’s claim that postmodern libraries are desirable. Logically there will be 
necessary or sufficient conditions for adoption of the postmodernist project in libraries. A 
sufficient condition would allow for the granting that adoption has indeed occurred. A 
necessary condition would allow that the lack of the condition shows a lack of the 
adoption. Linguistic indicators in the mission statements of libraries will serve as 
qualitative surrogates for these logical conditions. If indicators are present that are 
surrogates for sufficient conditions, then the adoption of the postmodernist project will be 
granted. Otherwise, if they are surrogates for necessary conditions, then the lack of 
adoption cannot be said. Achieving the decomposition of library mission statements into 
their basic aspects, which can then be said to be or not to be indicators, requires the study 
uses textual analysis of the content in mission statements. Furthermore, this kind of 
analysis will allow flexibility in distinguishing the categorical criteria for these indicators 
and make it more natural to interpret as such. Since no other persons are involved in this 
particular analysis of documents, only the author will have a role in conducting the study. 
The reason for looking at academic research libraries specifically is that the Association 
of Research Libraries (ARL) keeps a public list of all member institutions, making for a
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complete sampling frame to sample from. Only one mission statement found containing 
these indicators is needed to show adoption, or lack of lack of adoption, of the 
postmodernist project. Therefore, convenience sampling is the most sensical choice for 
sampling. Mission statements are reliable sampling units because they are official public 
documents that a library uses to self-impose values and roles, guide collection, user 
service, and knowledge management practices, and provide a means for transparency and 
accountability. Sample units will be taken from the sampling frame by convenience, more 
specifically, those ARL member libraries that have easily accessible mission statements. 
Access of the mission statements will be via each sampled ARL member’s website. The 
text of the mission statements will be copied into a simple text document to normalize 
their formats and prepare them for textual analysis. The convenience sampling used 
makes a weak case for the representativeness of the sample, even in a narrow community 
like ARL academic research libraries, but any presence of these indicators will suffice for 
the purposes of this paper. In addition, since the sampling frame includes only those 
libraries that are ARL member libraries, the case for generalizability is weak. Moreover, 
the use of convenience sampling limits the study to those libraries that have made their 
mission statements readily accessible on their websites. Despite these limitations, the 
hope is that readers will be able to recognize the applicability to their own practice and 
experience. Choosing to do a non-invasive study minimizes ethical risks and 
considerations. Mission statements are public, so issues of privacy and confidentiality are 
marginal.
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1.4 Results 
The results produced 10,549 tokens, once stop words are removed, and 2,004 types. The 
textual analysis of the content of those mission statements sampled shows that the words 
“diverse” and “diversity” are used a total of 86 times. To put this number in relief; the 
word “library” is only used 219 times. The word “inclusive” is used 17 times, whereas 
the word “preservation” is only used 23 times. The word “community” is used 115 times 
to the 124 times that “knowledge” is used and the 108 times that “collections” is used. 
 
Word Frequency Cloud
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1.5 Interpretation 
Librarians seem to be striving for diversity, inclusivity, and the eradication of 
marginalizing dominant narratives in their libraries. These goals indicate the necessary 
conditions for the adoption of the postmodernist project. This means two things: that 
these are certainly goals that librarians have articulated for themselves, and that they 
could be adopting the postmodernist project to strive for these goals. This paper will not 
be arguing against having these emancipatory goals, as they are, at least, prima facie 
praiseworthy goals for librarians to have for their libraries. However, is Lemoine correct 
in assuming that the adoption of the postmodernist project will support, or even allow, the 
realization of these outcomes? 
Boghossian’s book Fear of Knowledge is a sustained critique of the postmodernist view 
on knowledge. He presents an epistemic dilemma for the postmodernist. Either they are 
putting forward a view of knowledge that is self-contradictory, or they fall into a series of 
infinite regresses. Either way, the postmodernist is reasoning fallaciously (Boghossian 
2006). This epistemic dilemma can be made clear by considering the following 
hypothetical case. Imagine Shana, a bright young freshman who has approached the 
reference desk for research help on a project for her undergraduate history course. She 
asks the librarian for assistance researching the events of the Second World War. 
Specifically, she is interested in the Shoah and would like guidance selecting books on
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the history of the topic. John the reference librarian, a well-meaning postmodernist, is 
aware that there are a number of different positions on this history. Believing that there is 
no historical truth, let alone scientific or mathematical truths, he advises that Shana look 
at all the various narratives available—including the works of neo-Nazi “Holocaust 
deniers.” Shana smartly asks John why he would recommend reading the works of neo-
Nazis when she wants to look at the various authoritative sources on the subject. John 
replies that there is no such authority to be had and that he will not censor or exclude the 
works of neo-Nazis as having just as legitimate of positions as any other concerning the 
history of the Shoah. He makes the statement he is most found of making: “Who am I to 
judge?” Shana asks John why he is skeptical of the inequality in the veracity of these 
historical positions. John tells Shana that each historical position is completely 
constructed and relative to the person’s perspective; there are no objective facts in the 
matter, so he cannot see why one could be true at the expense of any other. “But, then 
isn’t it an objective fact that relative to any individual perspective that what it constructs 
as a true historical position is true?” asks Shana. John quickly rejoins, “No, that what 
each perspective constructs as true is true relative to that perspective would have to be yet 
again constructed and relative to a perspective.” “And that,” asks Shana, “is that then an 
objectively true fact.” John has fallen into Boghossian’s epistemic dilemma. He must 
admit either that some objective fact exists or his explanations will continue to regress ad 
infinitum. This thought experiment is useful for a couple of reasons. First, it shows how 
the postmodernist’s view about knowledge is hopelessly skeptical. John can never admit 
to an objective fact. Second, it shows how the emancipatory outcomes aimed at by the 
adoption of the postmodernist project can actually backfire. John is unable to say why a 
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neo-Nazi denier of the Shoah is wrong about history, furthering the marginalization of the 
Jewish people and giving authority and platform to a hate fueled conspiracy. I hope that 
John is not responsible for collection management. 
Descartes shows that, as thinking beings, there is an inability to be skeptical about the 
fact of having thoughts (Descartes 1996). This inability to step outside of one’s thoughts 
similarly applies to thinking about objective reality, if the criterion of certainty is relaxed 
from Descartes’ religious demand for absolute certainty. Thomas Nagel argues that even 
though scientific knowledge might be muddled beyond the point of unquestionable 
certainty, it is impossible for one to think outside of an objective framework (Nagel 
1997). Think of how an argument against objective reality would even work. Would the 
proponent of the position offer up supporting premises that are true? If they are only true 
from their perspective than communication has broken down. To make an argument there 
have to be publicly accessible reasons that the audience to the argument can grasp. What 
can they grasp, if the conclusion of the argument is true? Worse yet, how is the 
conclusion true—since nothing can actually be true? What is left is at best a series of 
guttural utterances; no truth or validity to be had from them. The postmodernist will 
complain that nonetheless an account of the metaphysics of truth will be unobtainable. 
However, a minimalist account of truth is possible without recourse to Platonic forms or 
innate ideas. The truth of any particular proposition consists simply in its being the case 
(Blackburn 2005). Questioning what truth is, in itself, seems to be yet another case of a 
category mistake. The question seems to be a good one because the form of the question 
is recognizable and sparks the intuition that it is a legitimate question. However, it is like 
the foreign student who has been promised that he will be shown the university, but after 
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seeing the library, residential halls, and classrooms asks where the university is that he 
been promised to see (Ryle 1949).  
It might yet be helpful to consider the notion of objective truth to be like a line. Engineers 
use lines all of the time in the construction of buildings, but they never see a line. They 
can only try to get to closer and closer approximations of a line. The soundness of their 
buildings are improved by better approximations, but they will never achieve a line in its 
absolute form; they can only remove the perturbations they discover in their attempts to 
construct buildings with lines. The notion of the line, like the notion of objective truth 
needn’t be obtainable with absolute certainty to remain essential and important to human 
activities. 
Despite concluding that the position implied by the postmodernist project is unfit for the 
undertaking of the emancipatory aims of libraries, and the ineffectiveness of any 
stringently postmodernist reply, also the postmodernist position will effectively 
undermine the notion of libraries as a public good. The notion of the public good comes 
from liberal political theory. Liberal political theory originates from the rise of post-
monarchical democratic politics. Before liberal political theory and after the feudal 
politics of Europe exists a political space that was dominated by mercantilism. That is, 
that the monarch’s role in politics is that of the benevolent leader of the people. The 
monarch looks after the good of society through regulation of domestic markets, foreign 
trade and other national interests. Liberal political theory removes the monarch from this 
role and places the people in this position. Self-rule by the people of a state though 
requires that the people are sufficiently informed and that they have been properly 
educated, so as not to be swayed by political movements that they have not critically 
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chosen for themselves and on which they vote. A democratic society must provide the 
means to this end, if a true democracy is to be sustained. For adult citizens this means the 
open access to libraries that act as branches of the national system of education 
(D'Angelo 2006). When libraries take on the postmodern project, they are admitting to 
being unable to adjudicate the quality of knowledge. Indeed, it is easy to re-conceptualize 
knowledge as merely information that serves no meaningful educational purpose in a 
democratic society when the postmodernist view on knowledge is taken on fully. A 
postmodern library will only be able to mirror the expressed needs of its community, and 
it will not be able to provide for greater collective needs. It also allows for the 
commodification of information by contemporary capitalist markets. What is lost is a 
public place for civic engagement in politics; this loss is filled by the reassurance of 
superficial consumerist commodities. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
This paper has tried to show that librarians are mistaken in taking up the postmodernist 
project in their libraries, if they are so doing. It gives the profession a theoretical stance 
about knowledge that is unfit for accomplishing the emancipatory aims of the library; 
undermines the pursuance of libraries as a public good; indulges an unreasonable 
skepticism about authority in general. This paper only looked at mission statements and 
discovered that it cannot be ruled out that at least some libraries are taking on this 
postmodernist project. However, more work needs to be done. This author suggests that 
collection management policies be looked at for indicators that are surrogates for the 
necessary or sufficient conditions of adoption of the postmodernist project. Conducting 
interviews with librarians would be especially helpful in teasing out the views about 
knowledge that librarians have, as well as whether they are effectively postmodernist in 
their nature. This author hopes that this paper will serve as a succinct warning against too 
easy of an acceptance of the postmodernist project in libraries, as well as a call for further 
debate by librarians concerning their views about knowledge and the impacts of those 
views on their professional practice and society at large. 
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